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CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL TIDE - AN EXAMINATION
OF How THE COURTS ADAPT FEDERAL
PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE IN RESPONSE TO
A SHIFT IN POLITICAL OPINION
ON IMMIGRATION
JohnPaul M. Callan* and Emily C. Callan**
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2012, President Obama surprised the country when he an-
nounced that his administration, in cooperation with the United States De-
partment of Homeland Security, would be implementing "Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals" (commonly referred to as DACA).1 The DACA
program allows eligible foreign nationals to apply for and receive a tempo-
rary suspension of any deportation proceeding against them, and also
makes them eligible for work authorization in the United States.
Leading up to and following the implementation of DACA, local gov-
ernments across the United States responded to what critics perceived2 as
President Obama's refusal to enforce immigration law by passing various
local ordinances aimed at prohibiting the rental of residential properties to
undocumented foreign nationals.3 Several of these ordinances were chal-
lenged shortly after their enactment with varying results.4 To date, at least
four circuit courts have considered such ordinances. Generally speaking,
while the Fifth, Third, and Eleventh Circuits have held that such ordi-
nances were pre-empted by federal law, the Eighth Circuit upheld the
* JohnPaul M. Callan is an attorney working in private practice in Reston, Virginia. His
published works include Reexamining the Federal Monetary Powers, 19 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 111
(2011).
** Emily C. Callan (nee Kendall) is an attorney working in private practice in Reston, Virginia.
She has published articles discussing various immigration and Constitutional issues in law journals
including the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, the John Marshall Law Review, the Michigan State
University College of Law International Law Review, the Journal of Supreme Court History, and others,
1. Press Release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Announces
Deferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities (Jun. 15, 2012) http://
www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-process-young-people-
who-are-low (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
2. Andrew Stiles, Obama's Immigration Non-Enforcement Actions, NAT'L REVIEW, Feb. 5,
2014, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/370446/obamas-immigration-non-enforcement-actions-
andrew-stiles.
3. Monica Davey, Nebraska Town Votes to Banish Illegal Immigrants N.Y. TIMEs, http://www
.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/us/22fremont.html?_r=0.
4. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 539 (5th Cir. 2013) (hold-
ing ordinance prohibiting rental to undocumented foreign nationals is unconstitutional); Lozano v. City
of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 323 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding ordinance prohibiting rental to undocumented
foreign nationals is unconstitutional); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012)
(holding ordinance prohibiting rental to undocumented foreign nationals is unconstitutional), cert de-
nied, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013); but see Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 939 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding
rental ordinance constitutional).
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housing ordinance stating ". .. [l]aws designed to deter, or even prohibit,
unlawfully present aliens from residing within a particular locality are not
tantamount to immigration laws establishing who may enter or remain in
the country. '' 5 Clearly, there are many political commentators and circuit
judges who disagree with the Eighth Circuit.6 However, as of this article's
publication, the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on and ultimately de-
cide this issue.7
While the subject matter of this unresolved circuit court split undoubt-
edly cuts to the very heart of the political debate regarding immigration, it
also presents a unique opportunity to consider the implications of the Su-
preme Court's recent decisions in Arizona v. United States8 and Chamber
of Commerce v. Whiting,9 both of which address federal pre-emption analy-
sis in the context of immigration law. In order to fully understand the im-
plications of these recent landmark decisions, a brief review of the
historical context from which they arise is necessary, for while Arizona rep-
resents a significant victory for those advocating undocumented workers'
rights, the same case also signifies a strong break from past decisions in the
field of immigration law, including De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1977),
which authorized the states to engage in a broad range of actions with re-
spect to regulations pertaining to unlawfully present foreign nationals.
Therefore, in order to fully examine and understand the circuit court
split decisions, Part II offers a summary and analysis of De Canas and pro-
vides a glimpse of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning federal
immigration law and pre-emption analysis prior to the Whiting and Ari-
zona decisions. Part III summarizes and analyzes Whiting and Arizona,
specifically considering the Supreme Court's efforts to reconcile Arizona
with its past decisions. Part III concludes that the Whiting and Arizona
decisions evidence the Supreme Court's trend to depart from the principles
guiding the De Canas decision. Part IV presents a summary of the recent
housing ordinance circuit court decisions and analyzes whether the Eighth
Circuit's current minority view coincides with Arizona and Whiting. Part
IV argues that the Eighth Circuit's position is invalid under current Su-
preme Court precedent as interpreted by Arizona and Whiting. Part V of
this paper concludes that should the Supreme Court continue its trends in
its pre-emption analysis, in the absence of an explicit savings clause,10
5. Keller, 719 F.3d at 941.
6. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Condemns Divided Eighth Circuit Ruling in Freemont Immi-
gration Case (June 28, 2013) bttp://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-condemns-divided-eighth-cir-
cuit-ruling-fremont-immigration-case (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
7. Villas at Parkside Partners, 726 F.3d at 539 (holding ordinance prohibiting rental to undocu-
mented foreign nationals is unconstitutional); Lozano, 724 F.3d at 323 (holding ordinance prohibiting
rental to undocumented foreign nationals is unconstitutional); Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301 (holding ordi-
nance prohibiting rental to undocumented foreign nationals is unconstitutional), cert denied, 133 S. Ct.
2022 (2013); but see Keller, 719 F.3d at 939 (holding rental ordinance constitutional).
8. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2462 (2012).
9. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011).
10. A savings clause is defined as, "[i]n a statute, an exception of a special item out of the general
things mentioned in the statute. A restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to save rights, while
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nearly any state or local law that in any way impacts immigration law or
immigrants will likely be struck down as pre-empted and unconstitutional.
Therefore, states and localities should be cautious before passing such laws,
for there are significant costs associated with the legal battles that ensue,"1
and Congress should be careful to include explicit and broad savings
clauses, if its intent is to permit state and local authorities to regulate cer-
tain domains relating to immigration law.
II. IMMIGRATION PRE-EMPTION ANALYSIS IN 1975: DE CANAS v. BICA
Thus far, each court that has recently considered whether local statutes
are pre-empted by federal immigration law,' 2 as well as both Whiting13 and
Arizona,'4 have heavily relied upon De Canas15 in making their determina-
tions. Given the great weight that many courts have granted the De Canas
decision, a brief discussion of its facts and analysis is necessary to fully con-
sider the now emerging circuit court split.
In De Canas, American farm workers brought a lawsuit against farm
labor contractors arguing that the employer's refusal to offer the farm
workers permanent employment was a direct result of the employer's hir-
ing of undocumented foreign nationals and in direct violation of Cal. Lab.
Code § 2805, which prohibited the employment of such workers.' 6 The
lower courts held that § 2805 was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate
within the field of immigration and naturalization, and that this field was
pre-empted from state regulation by federal law.' 7 The Supreme Court re-
versed the lower courts, finding that a federal regulation should not be
deemed pre-emptive of state regulatory power in the absence of a clear
congressional intent to pre-empt, or unless the nature of the regulated sub-
ject matter permitted no other conclusion.'" The Supreme Court con-
cluded that respondents failed to demonstrate anything in the plain
proceedings are pending, from the obliteration that would result from an unrestricted repeal. The pro-
vision in a statute, sometimes referred to as the severability clause, that rescues the balance of the
statute from a declaration of unconstitutionality if one or more parts are invalidated. With respect to
existing rights, a saving clause enables the repealed law to continue in force." WEST's ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF AMERICAN LAW (2005) available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3437703913.html.
11. Daniel B. Wood, Nebraska town: Is illegal immigration crackdown worth the cost? CHRIS-IAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jul. 27, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.comUSA/2010/0727/Nebraska-
town-Is-illegal-immigration-crackdown-worth-the-cost.
12. Villas at Parkside Partners, 726 F.3d at 539 (holding ordinance prohibiting rental to undocu-
mented foreign nationals is unconstitutional); Lozano, 724 F.3d at 323 (holding ordinance prohibiting
rental to undocumented foreign nationals is unconstitutional); Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1301 (holding
ordinance prohibiting rental to undocumented foreign nationals is unconstitutional), cert denied, 133 S.
Ct. 2022 (2013); but see Keller, 719 F.3d at 939 (holding rental ordinance constitutional); see also Valle
Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States. v. South Carolina,
720 F.3d 518, 531-32 (4th Cir. 2013); Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691
F.3d 1250, 1267 (11th Cir. 2012).
13. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973.
14. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497.
15. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 352 (1976).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 353-54.
18. Id. at 356.
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language of 8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq., or its legislative history that warranted
the conclusion that it was intended to pre-empt harmonious state regula-
tion touching on aliens in general, or the employment of undocumented
foreign nationals in particular.1 9
The De Canas Court also noted that while the "[p]ower to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power ... the Court
has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with
aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this
constitutional power, whether latent or exercised."2 ° The Court further
elaborated that "the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does
not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determina-
tion of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain."2 1 In further support
of this proposition, the Court reasoned that if it were the case that any state
statute of which an alien is subject is on its face a "regulation of immigra-
tion[,]" then "there would have been no need.., even to discuss the rele-
vant congressional enactments in finding pre-emption of state regulation if
all state regulation of aliens was ipso facto regulation of
immigration . "..."22
With respect to the specific California statute at issue, the Court stated
that "even if such local regulation has some purely speculative and indirect
impact on immigration, it does not thereby become a constitutional pro-
scribed regulation of immigration that Congress itself would be powerless
to authorize or approve."2 3 The Court further acknowledged that a review
of the Immigration and National Act (hereinafter "INA") and its legisla-
tive history did not evidence that "Congress intended to preclude even har-
monious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the employment
of illegal aliens in particular."2 4 "Nor can such intent be derived from the
scope and detail of the INA." 5 In short, the Court narrowed the scope of
the INA's "central purpose" to "the terms and conditions of admission to
the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the coun-
try."26 As such, the Court concluded that, while the INA was comprehen-
sive as to the regulation of immigration and naturalization, "without more
[the INA] cannot be said to draw in the employment of [undocumented
foreign nationals]."27
As will be further discussed below, the narrow view of the scope of
federal immigration law as only pertaining to "the terms and conditions of
19. Id. at 357-58.
20. Id. at 355 (internal citations omitted).
21. Id. at 355, superseded by statute, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce of United States. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct.
1968 (2011).
22. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.
23. Id. at 355-56.
24. Id. at 358.
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admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in
the country" adopted by the De Canas Court has largely been rejected by
the Supreme Court's most recent decisions on the issue. This rejection
seems to represent a departure from the Court's previously held belief that
the INA did not prevent state or local action on issues that may relate to
foreign nationals.
III. IMMIGRATION PRE-EMPTION ANALYSIS IN 2011-2012: CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF UNITED STATES V. WHITING
AND UNITED STATES V. ARIZONA
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, the Supreme
Court considered "a recently enacted Arizona statute-the Legal Arizona
Workers Act-[which] provides that the licenses of state employers that
knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens may be, and in cer-
tain circumstances must be, suspended or revoked."28 This consideration
was made in light of a "[f]federal immigration law [that] expressly pre-
empts 'any State or local law [from] imposing civil or criminal sanctions
(other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ...
unauthorized aliens."'2 9 In addition, the Court considered whether the Ar-
izona statute's requirement that employers use the E-verify system was
pre-empted under federal law.3" The Court concluded that because the
state's licensing law "fall[s] squarely within the federal statute's savings
clause and the Arizona regulation does not otherwise conflict with federal
law[,]" the Arizona law is not pre-empted by federal immigration law. 1
Most illustrative of the Court's underlying rationale is the Court's con-
sideration of the plaintiff's argument that Arizona's licensing provision is
pre-empted because acceptance of the statute would enable fifty separate
systems of prohibition concerning unauthorized workers "and that Con-
gress instead wanted uniformity in immigration law enforcement."32 While
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion considered this point to be highly rele-
vant,33 the majority opinion responds to this argument by stating that
"Congress expressly preserved the ability of the States to impose their own
sanctions through licensing; that - like our federal system in general - nec-
essarily entails the prospect of some departure from homogeneity."34 In-
terestingly, the Court relies upon the express savings clause 35 as the
primary, if not sole, basis for the Court's rejection of Justice Breyer's argu-
ment concerning the "departure from one centralized enforcement scheme
under federal law."
36
28. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011).
29. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1979 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1979, 1991.
34. Id. at 1979-80.
35. See supra note 10.
36. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1979-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2015]
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The fact that the majority opinion also relies upon the savings clause
as the basis for upholding the Arizona law is supported by the Court's view
that although the law is to be expressly pre-empted, it is impliedly pre-
empted due to its conflict with federal law:
At its broadest level, the Chamber's argument is that Con-
gress intended the federal system to be exclusive, and that
any state system therefore necessarily conflicts with federal
law . . . But Arizona's procedures simply implement the
sanctions that Congress expressly allowed Arizona to pur-
sue through licensing laws. Given that Congress specifically
preserved such authority for the States, it stands to reason
that Congress did not intend to prevent the States from us-
ing appropriate tools to exercise that authority.
37
While the Court later adds that because the Arizona statute was written to
strictly comply with federal immigration law, e.g., by never granting state
and local authorities power to determine lawful immigration status, the Ar-
izona statute does not conflict with the federal law. It appears that in the
absence of the express savings clause present in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h), such
state laws would likely be prohibited as they would undoubtedly impinge
upon the uniform federal system established and enforced in Arizona.
In Arizona, the United States Supreme Court struck down as federally
pre-empted several sections of Arizona statute S.B. 1070 which (1) re-
quired documented foreign nationals to carry registration documents at all
times; (2) allowed state police to arrest an individual for suspicion of being
an undocumented foreign national; and (3) made it a crime for an undocu-
mented foreign national to search for a job (or to hold one) in the state."38
The Court unanimously agreed to uphold the provision of the law allowing
Arizona state police to investigate the immigration status of an individual
stopped, detained, or arrested if there is reasonable suspicion that individ-
ual is in the country without immigration authorization.
39
In making its decision, the Supreme Court first summarized the gen-
eral principles of pre-emption doctrine, stating that "there is no doubt that
Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a
statute containing an express pre-emption provision[.] ' 40 However, the
Court noted that
"[s]tate law must also give way to federal law in at least two
other circumstances. First, the States are precluded from
regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its
proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its
exclusive governance ... [which] can be inferred from a
37. Id at 1981.
38. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012).
39. Id. at 2510-11.
40. Id. at 2500-01.
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frame of regulation "so pervasive . . . that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it" or where there is a
"federal interest.., so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject." Second, state laws are pre-empted when they
conflict with federal law.4
With respect to Section 3 of S.B. 1070, which created a state misde-
meanor for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration docu-
ment[,]" the Court held that since alien registration is a complete and
comprehensive federal system, "even a complementary state regulation is
impermissible" and, as such, Section 3, regardless of whether it had the
same aim as federal law, could not pass constitutional muster.42 Further-
more, the Court noted that Section 3 in many ways conflicted with federal
law. For example, "[w]ere § 3 to come into force, the State would have the
power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal
law even in circumstances where federal officials in charge of the compre-
hensive scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal poli-
cies" or the fact that "[u]nder federal law, the failure to carry registration
papers is a misdemeanor that may be punished by a fine, imprisonment, or
a term of probation[ yet] State law, by contrast, rules out probation as a
possible sentence.,
43
With respect to Section 5(c), the Court first notes that it "enacts a state
criminal prohibition where no federal counterpart exists[ by] mak[ing] it a
state misdemeanor for 'an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work,
solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or indepen-
dent contractor.' 
44
In considering Section 5(c), the Supreme Court states:
When there was no comprehensive federal program regulat-
ing the employment of unauthorized aliens, this Court
found that a State had authority to pass its own laws on the
subject. In 1971, for example, California passed a law im-
posing civil penalties on the employment of aliens who were
"not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such
employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resi-
dent workers." The law was upheld against a pre-emption
challenge in De Canas v. Bica. De Canas recognized that
"States possess broad authority under their police powers to
regulate the employment relationship to protect workers
within the State.
45
41. Id. at 2501 (internal citations omitted).
42. Id. at 2502.
43. Id. at 2503 (internal citations omitted).
44. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STATE. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2011)).
45. Id. (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1976)).
2015]
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However, the Court noted that "[a]t [the time De Canas was decided] ...
the Federal Government had expressed no more than 'a peripheral concern
with the employment of illegal entrants."46 The Court proceeded to argue
and ultimately hold that employment of undocumented foreign nationals is
now subject to a comprehensive federal framework,47 but did not base its
holding that the statute was unconstitutional on these grounds alone. In-
stead, the Court added that because the law added criminal penalties to
what under federal law was only punished civilly, the law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the purposes and objec-
tives of Congress."48 Nonetheless, a plain reading of the opinion indicates
that De Canas is no longer valid law, at least insofar as it holds that states
may pass additional regulations in the field of employment of undocu-
mented foreign nationals.
Turning to Section 6 of S.B. 1070, which "provides that a state officer,
'without warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to
believe .. . [the person] has committed any public offense that makes [him
or her] removable from the United States[,]"' the Court first notes that
although under federal law it is a crime to be unlawfully present in the
United States.49 For an undocumented alien to be subject to a warrant for
an arrest, first a lengthy federal procedure must be followed, including the
issuance of a Notice to Appear and an opportunity to be heard with respect
to the removal (i.e. deportation) proceeding.50 In addition, the Court notes
that in the event a warrant is issued, "warrants are executed by federal
officers who have received training in the enforcement of immigration
law."51
In contrast to the federal system referenced above, the Court found
that the Arizona statute would allow officers to arrest an alien without fed-
eral warrant and regardless of whether an alien was likely to escape (as
required under federal law).52 The Court concluded that such authority
exercised by the state "would allow the State to achieve its own immigra-
tion policy" and the "result could be unnecessary harassment of some
aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or someone assisting with a
criminal investigation) whom federal officials determine should not be re-
moved [deported]. ' 53 The Court further held that "[b]y authorizing state
officers to decide whether an alien should be detained for being removable
[deportable], [Section] 6 violates the principle that the [deportation] pro-
cess is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.1
54
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2504.
48. Id. at 2505.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2505-06.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2506.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2507.
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In summary, the Court held that Section 3, which created a state mis-
demeanor for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration doc-
ument, was pre-empted as an attempt to regulate an area of federal law,
i.e., Alien Registration. The Court took the view that federal law compre-
hensively occupied the area of Alien Registration. It went on to decide
that Section 5(c), which makes it a state misdemeanor for "an unauthorized
alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform
work as an employee or independent contractor[,]" conflicts with federal
law because the field of employment immigration law is also pervasively
regulated. Finally, the Court held that Section 6, which authorizes state
officers to arrest persons suspected of unlawful presence, is pre-empted be-
cause while "Congress has put in place a system in which state officers may
not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability ex-
cept in specific, limited circumstances ... [Section 6] authoriz[es] state and
local officers to engage in these enforcement activities as a general matter"
thereby "creat[ing] an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."55
While on its face Arizona does not specifically nor explicitly reverse
the immigration pre-emption analysis established by De Canas, in light of
the majority of circuit courts' interpretation and application of the Arizona
and Whiting decisions, it is reasonable to infer that a much more substantial
shift in the Court's viewpoint of federal pre-emption has occurred, as
demonstrated through the Arizona decision.
IV. IMMIGRATION PRE-EMPTION ANALYSIS TODAY
Following a surge in public opinion against providing undocumented
foreign nationals with state social services, local governments from several
states responded by passing a number of ordinances which prohibited the
rental of residential properties to this population. Several of these ordi-
nances were challenged shortly after their enactment with varying results.56
To date, at least four circuit courts have made decisions with respect to
such ordinances. Generally speaking, while the Fifth, Third, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that such ordinances are pre-empted by federal law, the
Eighth Circuit, in Keller v. City of Fremont, upheld the housing ordinance
stating "laws designed to deter, or even prohibit, unlawfully present aliens
from residing within a particular locality are not tantamount to immigra-
tion laws establishing who may enter or remain in the country."57 Before
considering the rationale set forth by the majority opinions of the Fifth,
55. Id. at 2506.
56. See, e.g. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 539 (5th Cir.
2013) (holding ordinance prohibiting rental to undocumented foreign nationals is unconstitutional);
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 323 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding ordinance prohibiting rental to
undocumented foreign nationals is unconstitutional); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301
(11th Cir. 2012) (holding ordinance prohibiting rental to undocumented foreign nationals is unconstitu-
tional), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013); but see Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 939 (8th Cir.
2013) (holding rental ordinance constitutional).
57. Keller, 719 F.3d at 941..
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Third, and Eleventh Circuits, Part III will consider the analysis used in Kel-
ler in light of the Arizona and Whiting decisions. Part III will then summa-
rize and analyze the Fifth Circuit Court's decision, which is nearly identical
in rationale to the Third and Eleventh Circuits' decisions. Part III con-
cludes that the Third Circuit's decision is better aligned with the Arizona
and Whiting decisions.
In Keller, the plaintiff landlords and tenants sued to prevent the City
of Fremont's enforcement of Ordinance No. 5165 (hereinafter "the Ordi-
nance"), which prohibited the rental of housing units to undocumented for-
eign nationals.58 Specifically, the Ordinance prohibits any person or
business from renting to or permitting occupancy by an undocumented for-
eign national, who is defined as "an alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States, according to the terms of United States Code Title 8, Sec-
tion 1101 et seq.. ' 9 In order to enforce the Ordinance, the Ordinance fur-
ther provided "that prospective renters over the age of 18 must obtain an
occupancy license from the City, and must obtain a new license if they
move to different rental properties.,
61
To obtain this license, the Ordinance required the applicant to provide
personal information, including whether the applicant is lawfully present in
the United States.6' While an occupancy license is immediately issued, if
local authorities later learn from the federal government that the renter is
unlawfully present in the United States, the police are instructed to send
the renter a deficiency notice, at which point the renter then has 60 days to
establish lawful presence.62 If upon the completion of the 60-day period
the renter has yet to establish lawful presence, as determined and reported
by the federal government pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Section
1373(c), then the occupancy license is revoked and violators of the ordi-
nance face a $100 per violation, per day, fine.6 3
The plaintiffs challenged the Ordinance and contended that "the
rental provisions are constitutionally pre-empted because they have the im-
permissible effect of regulating immigration by expelling from the City
aliens who are not lawfully present in the United States."' In addition, the
plaintiffs argued that "the rental provisions intrude on a federally occupied
'field,' alien removal, which is exclusively governed by complex removal
procedures prescribed by Congress in the INA. ''65
In considering these broad arguments, the Eighth Circuit quickly dis-
missed the plaintiffs' contention that the rental ordinance constitutes re-
moval, arguing that "these provisions neither determine 'who should or
should not be admitted into the country,' nor do they more than marginally
58. Id. at 937.
59. Id.




64. Id. at 941.
65. Id.
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affect 'the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain. '"66 It is
important to highlight that the Eighth Circuit's narrow view of what consti-
tutes "removal" reflects the De Canas decision, where the Supreme Court
held that "the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not
render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination
of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the condi-
tions under which a legal entrant may remain, "67 and that "even if such
local regulation has some purely speculative and indirect impact on immi-
gration, it does not thereby become a constitutional proscribed regulation
of immigration ....
In the alternative to the plaintiffs' contention that the rental ordi-
nances impinged upon the field of federal removal, the plaintiffs argued
that the "Ordinance's rental provisions are also pre-empted by federal leg-
islation that wholly occupies two other fields, alien registration and anti-
harboring. ' 69 In considering these arguments, the Court first noted as a
general matter that "[e]very Act of Congress occupies some field, but we
must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has pre-
cluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the
Constitution. 70
With respect to plaintiffs' argument that the Ordinance intruded upon
the field of Alien Registration, the Court reasoned that while "Congress
intended to create 'a single integrated and all-embracing system' for alien
registration"' 71 with the result that "even complimentary state regulation is
impermissible," the occupancy Ordinance was "nothing like the state regis-
tration laws invalidated" in past decisions.72 The Ordinance required all
renters, not just aliens, to obtain an occupancy license, and "does not apply
to all aliens [but instead] excludes non-renters."73 Furthermore, while ap-
plicants for the occupancy license were required to disclose information
aliens must disclose when complying with federal alien registration laws,
"that does not turn a local property licensing program into a pre-empted
alien registration regime.
74
In short, the Court argued that to hold the Ordinance as pre-empted
"would mean that any time a State collects basic information from its re-
sidents, including aliens - such as before issuing driver's licenses - it imper-
missibly intrudes into the field of alien registration.
7 5
66. Id. (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976)).
67. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.
68. Id. at 355-56.
69. Keller, 719 F.3d at 942.
70. Id. (citing De Canas, 424 U.S at 360 n. 8).
71. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52. 70 (1941)).
72. Id. at 942-43 (quoting Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012)) (internal cita-
tions omrnmitted).
73. Id. at 943.
74. Id.
75. id. at 943.
2015]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Turning to the plaintiffs' argument with respect to the anti-harboring
provision, the Court "[found] nothing in an anti-harboring prohibition con-
tained in one sub-part of one subsection of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 that establishes
a 'framework of regulation so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it,' or evinces 'a federal interest ... so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject."76 As such, the Court declined to strike down
the Ordinance as pre-empted by federal statutes and the federal anti-har-
boring field.77
Finally, the Court considered whether the Ordinance interferes with
"'a principal feature of the [federal] removal system,' the broad discretion
exercised by immigration officials to determine which aliens [illegally] pre-
sent in the United States should be removed from the country."78 While
the Court conceded that the Ordinance would "indirectly effect the 're-
moval' of any alien from the [c]ity," it nonetheless held that such an indi-
rect effect would be far too broad an interpretation of federal immigration
law to reconcile it with cases such as De Canas and Whiting.7 9 In those
cases, the Supreme Court permitted states to deny employment to certain
aliens, despite the fact that "denying aliens employment inevitably has the
effect of 'removing' them from the State."8 The Court added that "as the
rental provisions do not 'remove' any alien from the United States (or even
from the City), federal immigration officials retain complete discretion to
decide whether and when to pursue removal proceedings."81 The Court
further distinguished the Ordinance by pointing out that unlike Section 6 of
the law at issue in Arizona, the Ordinance does not require that local offi-
cials to assess whether an alien is removable from the United States.82
Thus, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' contention that the effects of
the Ordinance would be to "remove" an alien prior to a removal hearing,
because the effect of the Ordinance was merely to deny a rental occupancy
license in a particular locality.83 Furthermore, the Court noted that be-
cause the challenge to the Ordinance was a facial challenge, it would not
consider speculations regarding the manner in which state and local official
would implement the regulations and the effects that such regulations will
have on the nation at large, in assessing whether the Ordinance "stand[s] as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. '84 The Court's refusal to consider the logical impli-
cations and likely long-term effects of State and local ordinances is not
present in other recent circuit court decisions to consider similar issues;
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 943-44.





84. Id. at 945.
[VOL. 33:259
CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL TIDE
neither can the Eighth Circuit's narrow approach be reconciled with Ari-
zona nor Whiting.
Indeed, each court that has considered pre-emption questions
presented in Keller has relied upon Arizona to expand the scope of all fed-
eral "fields" which involve immigration law. For example, in Whiting," the
Ninth Circuit considered whether an injunction was properly issued against
the enforcement of an Arizona statute which criminalized the harboring
and transporting of unauthorized aliens.86 In contrast to the Eighth Cir-
cuit's view that "nothing in an anti-harboring prohibition contained in one
sub-part of one subsection of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 [ ] establishes a 'framework
of regulation so pervasive ... [ ] Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it,"' 87 the Ninth Circuit found that "the [statutory] scheme
governing the crimes associated with the movement of unauthorized aliens
in the United States... provides a full set of standards designed to work as
a harmonious whole[.]" '88 The Ninth Circuit's broad interpretation of the
anti-harboring provisions relied upon a number of federal decisions dis-
persed throughout the United States, including the Third, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits, all of which used a much more expansive view of federal
immigration law, and all of which resulted in the finding that each state
statute or local ordinance was pre-empted.89 Similar in approach to Valle
Del Sol Inc., the Third Circuit's decision in Lozano properly summarized
the views set forth in the majority opinions regarding rental ordinances
similar to those at issue in the Eighth Circuit's decision.
In Lozano,9" the Third Circuit was compelled by the Supreme Court
to reconsider its previous decision to strike down a rental ordinance which
was substantially similar to the ordinance upheld in Keller, in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions of Whiting and Arizona. However, upon recon-
sidering the matter, the Third Circuit nonetheless concluded that the
"housing provisions of the Hazelton ordinances are pre-empted by federal
immigration law." 91
In summarizing Whiting and Arizona, the Third Circuit stated that
while the Supreme Court permitted Arizona's efforts to "regulate the em-
ployment of unauthorized aliens through a business licensing law," it also
"largely rejected Arizona's efforts to enact its own immigration policies." 92
Using this as the basis for its rationale, the Court first struck down the
employment provisions which were also at issue in Lozano because the
85. Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1026 n. 18.
88. Id. at 1024-25.
89. Id. at 1025-26. (citing Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013); United States
v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 531-32 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1288
(11th Cir. 2012); Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1267 (11th
Cir. 2012)).
90. Lozano, 724 F.3d at 297.
91. Id. at 300.
92. Id. at 303.
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state's definition of "employment" was far too broad and thus in contradic-
tion with federal law. 93 The Court then turned to the rental ordinances at
issue.
In contrast to Keller's holding that local prohibition of occupancy li-
censes does not regulate immigration or constitute removal, the Third Cir-
cuit held that "[t]hrough its housing provisions, Hazleton attempts to
regulate residence based solely on immigration status."94 As such, the Third
Circuit concluded "that enforcement of the housing provisions must be en-
joined because '[d]eciding which aliens may live in the United States has
always been the prerogative of the federal government."' 95 The Third Cir-
cuit further adds that "although Hazleton's housing provisions do not con-
trol actual physical entry into, or expulsion from, Hazleton or the United
States, 'in essence, that is precisely what they attempt to do."' 96 Thus, the
Third Circuit equates Hazleton's prohibition of rental licenses for undocu-
mented persons with the actual removal of undocumented foreign
nationals.
Such reasoning clearly breaks from the De Canas decision in that the
Third Circuit considers the indirect consequences of the statute, rather than
limiting itself to the immediate and concrete impact of the statute. For
example, in De Canas, the obvious consequence of laws prohibiting the
employment of undocumented foreign nationals is that this population as a
whole would be less inclined to reside in California, if not the United
States, but the Court was unwilling to consider such consequences suffi-
ciently direct or conflicting with federal law to find that the California stat-
ute conflicted with the Federal government's broad authority over the
removal power. 97 The De Canas decision states:
In this case, California has sought to strengthen its economy
by adopting federal standards in imposing criminal sanc-
tions against state employers who knowingly employ aliens
who have no federal right to employment within the coun-
try; even if such local regulation has some purely speculative
and indirect impact on immigration, it does not thereby be-
come a constitutionally proscribed regulation of
immigration.98
The Supreme Court's reasoning in De Canas is in stark contrast to the
Third Circuit's equating of the denial of occupancy licenses with federal
removal. Justice Scalia's discussion of De Canas in his dissenting opinion in
93. Id. at 308.
94. Id. at 315 (quoting Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 220 (3d Cir. 2013)) (emphasis
added).
95. Id. (quoting Lozano, 620 F.3d at 220).
96. Id. at 315-316 (quoting Lozano, 620 F.3d at 220) (internal citations omitted).
97. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1976).
98. Id.
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Arizona adds to this analysis.99 Justice Scalia writes: "This Court con-
cluded that the California law was not pre-empted, as Congress had neither
occupied the field of 'regulation of employment of illegal aliens' nor ex-
pressed 'the clear and manifest purpose' of displacing such state regula-
tion."'" Scalia continued that "[t]he only relevant change" with respect to
federal immigration law as it pertains to employment since the De Canas
decision "is that Congress has since enacted its own restrictions on employ-
ers who hire illegal aliens, in legislation that also includes some civil (but
no criminal) penalties on illegal aliens who accept unlawful employ-
ment."' 1 Justice Scalia concluded that, "at the time De Canas was de-
cided, [the Arizona Statute concerning the employment of illegal aliens]
would have been indubitably lawful"102 and found that the federal statu-
tory changes since the De Canas decision have done nothing to change the
Court's analysis of employment laws touching on illegal aliens.'03
Thus, a close reading of the De Canas decision, as well as Arizona,
Whiting, and Lozano, leads to the conclusion that while much has changed
with respect to the interpretation of the reach of the INA since De Canas
was decided, there is also a clear judicial trend toward broader definitions
of federal authority, and limited views on state and local authority concern-
ing aliens.10 4 Not surprisingly, the only state statute to be both recently
scrutinized by the Supreme Court and to survive such scrutiny was one
which was explicitly protected by a savings clause - Arizona's Legal Ari-
zona Workers Act.0 5
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the overwhelming majority of courts having set forth similar
analyses and conclusions to that which is presented in Lozano, 6 it appears
that should the Supreme Court consider the issues raised by the Eighth
Circuit's Keller decision and follow the Whiting and Arizona framework,
the rental ordinance provisions will likely be struck down as federally pre-





104. For example, at one point in the De Canas decision, the Court notes that the petitioner,
arguing in favor of the local statute, "conceded at oral argument that, on its face [the statute preventing
alien employment] would apply to aliens [not lawfully present, but authorized to work under federal
law] and thus conflict with federal law." De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 364 (1976). Yet, the Court
nonetheless tolerated this actual conflict with federal law on the basis that administrative regulations
define "alien" as not only green card holders, but also those authorized by the federal government to
work. Id.
105. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
106. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1263-65 (11th Cir.
2012) (concluding that federal law occupies the field with respect to "the entry, movement, and resi-
dence of aliens within the United States" and state law proscribing, inter alia, harboring is field pre-
empted); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1285-87 (11th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 2022
(2013); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463, 468 (D.S.C. 2012) (concluding that the
provisions of state law proscribing transporting of sheltering aliens lacking lawful status "infringe upon
a comprehensive federal statutory scheme"), affd, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013).
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empted. Furthermore, while it may be a premature forecast, it appears that
should the Court continue its current trends with respect to pre-emption
analysis in the field of immigration law, in the absence of an explicit savings
clause, nearly any state or local law that in anyway impacts undocumented
or documented foreign nationals will likely be struck down as pre-empted
and unconstitutional. Therefore, states and localities should be cautious
before utilizing such strategies, and Congress should be careful to include
such explicit savings clauses, should its actual intent be to permit state au-
thority in certain domains.
